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Crop coexistence is now at the core of the debate on GM technology in Europe. 
New regulations are being designed in the E.U. in order to “correct” potential production 
externalities and ensure that conventional and organic production will remain a profitable 
alternative for farmers. 
We use a simple Mussa-Rosen type model of preferences to capture the effects of 
introducing a cost-saving GM crop on incumbent crops, taking explicitly into account 
consumers’ distaste for GM food products. Using a two-technology model, we derive 
necessary and sufficient conditions for coexistence and show that perfectly competitive 
farmers with rational expectations will adopt the socially efficient level of GM 
technology. We also solve a three-technology model to study the impacts of the 
availability of GM technology on conventional and organic production. We formally 
characterize the entire set of possible outcomes using only three parameters that reflect 
technologies’ relative performance. We use our model to explore the effects of negative 
production externalities created by GM technology and of a change in consumers’ tastes 
on coexistence.   3
Pierre R. Merel 
Colin A. Carter 
THE COEXISTENCE OF GM AND NON-GM CROPS AND THE ROLE OF 
CONSUMER PREFERENCES 
INTRODUCTION 
Opposition to genetically modified organisms (GMOs) by European citizens has 
primarily been motivated by food safety and environmental concerns. In late 2003, the 
European Union (E.U.) adopted a new set of regulations pertaining to the 
commercialization of genetically modified (GM) food and feed. A centralized procedure 
for the pre-market approval of GM food and feed was instituted (European Parliament 
and Council, 2003). The regulations also mandate that operators adopt appropriate 
traceability systems to ensure that GMOs and products thereof can be identified along the 
food chain. In addition, new labeling rules were introduced to enable consumers to better 
identify food products that contain GMOs or ingredients derived from GMOs. According 
to the European Commission, such measures were necessary to restore consumer 
confidence in GM foods with the goal of enabling a viable GM crop production sector to 
emerge in Europe (see for instance the speech by David Byrne, European Commissioner 
for Health and Consumer Protection, 2001). 
The next step in the European Union’s efforts to induce GM crop production will 
be the adoption of measures pertaining to the coexistence of GM, conventional, and 
organic crops (European Commission, 2003). Indeed, many opponents of GMOs have 
argued that GM technology is not compatible with the existence of conventional and 
organic production sectors, since cross pollination and contamination along the food 
chain are likely to occur as soon as GMOs are grown on a commercial scale. Many   4
organic and conventional producers fear that the threshold for adventitious presence of 
GM material in non-GM crops will be difficult to achieve, or at least that the presence of 
GM crops will increase their costs significantly. Organic farmers in particular would need 
to take additional segregation measures to avoid commingling along the food chain, if 
they want to supply GM-free products (i.e., products that do not contain GM material 
above the detection level).  
Agronomic research suggests that coexistence between these technologies is 
feasible, but that new segregation measures, such as buffer zones or dedicated means of 
handling and transportation will be necessary to avoid contamination (Bock et al., 2002). 
Besides, the cost of segregation is likely to be higher if GM technology is widespread and 
if the purity level for non-GM crops is higher. Hence, adoption of GM technology by 
some farmers may create negative production externalities on conventional producers. At 
the same time, demand for non-GM foods, particularly organic products, is likely to be 
sensitive to the tolerance level. This suggests that organic farming could be driven out by 
GM technology, if consumers are unwilling to pay for high segregation costs or if their 
valuation for organic products decreases due to the adoption of tolerance levels. 
In this paper, we develop a simple theoretical model of production and 
consumption of a differentiated agricultural product to give insight into the conditions 
under which both GM and non-GM varieties are offered in equilibrium. We formally 
show that whether or not all varieties coexist, the level of adoption of GM technology is 
socially efficient under perfect competition and in the absence of production externalities. 
Finally, we use our model to analyze the effects of a production externality or a change in 
consumers’ preferences on coexistence.   5
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Literature on the coexistence of GM and non-GM crops is recent and mostly 
focuses on conditions necessary to avoid commingling between GM and non GM 
material or to reduce it to an acceptable level. Bock et al. (2002) provide some insight 
into the costs associated with segregation practices in Europe for different crops. Bullock 
and Desquilbet (2002) examine the distribution of segregation costs along the food-
processing chain for the U.S. grain market and provide quantitative measures for those 
costs. However, neither of those papers discusses the sustainability of one production 
technology by introducing demand considerations into the model. We believe nonetheless 
that demand is crucial in explaining the coexistence of GM and non GM technologies. As 
outlined by Brookes (2004), if consumers do not distinguish between GM and non GM 
foods, there is no coexistence issue. In this case, economic theory predicts that the cost-
saving GM technology entirely replaces the existing technology. This result is certainly 
true if the improved technology is made available for free, as could be the case if it was 
the fruit of publicly-funded agricultural research. Moschini and Lapan (1997) investigate 
the effects of intellectual property rights (IPRs) on the adoption of a superior innovation. 
They show that when the improved input (such as a biotech seed) is licensed by a 
monopolist protected by IPRs, the monopoly prices the innovation so that adoption is 
complete, whether the monopolist is constrained in his pricing decision by competition 
with the suppliers of the old input (non drastic innovation) or not (drastic innovation). 
Although adoption is complete, the question of whether farmers actually gain from 
adopting the new technology depends on the characteristic of the innovation (drastic or 
non drastic) and the degree of competition among suppliers of the conventional inputs. 
Lapan and Moschini (2000) show that when the price of another input (say land) is   6
endogenous to the model and is affected by adoption of the innovation, the monopolist’s 
pricing decision might lead to incomplete adoption. In their model, the coexistence of the 
old and new technology does not stem from the structure of consumer preferences. It 
should be recognized nonetheless that consumers’ perception of GM products as being of 
low quality compared to conventional or organic products can lead to market outcomes 
where coexistence is sustainable.  
Consumers’ distaste for GM products has been modeled by Giannakas and Fulton 
(2002) and Fulton and Giannakas (2004)
1. Those authors use Mussa-Rosen (1978) 
preferences to analyze different policy scenarios concerning the introduction and labeling 
of GM foods. Throughout their analysis, they assume that whenever GM crops are 
allowed, coexistence between conventional and GM varieties is guaranteed. In this paper, 
we use a similar structure of consumer preferences but we relax the assumption of 
guaranteed coexistence in order to study which factors might affect coexistence in 
equilibrium. Lapan and Moschini (2004) study the worldwide welfare effects of 
segregation and traceability requirements when a GM producing country (the U.S.) does 
not label GM foods and an importing country (the E.U.) mandates labeling. Although 
their analysis has a broader scope than that of the present paper, their model does not 
permit a careful study of coexistence issues at the domestic level since it assumes that 
GM goods are produced only in the U.S. and that U.S. consumers are indifferent between 
GM and non-GM foods. Conversely, although European consumers care about GM foods, 
European farmers are only allowed to grow the conventional variety. 
                                                 
1 Crespi and Marette (2003) also use Mussa-Rosen preferences to model consumers’ attitudes towards GM 
foods. However, they do allow some consumers to be indifferent between GM and non-GM foods.   7
MODEL ASSUMPTIONS 
Under perfect information, alternative production technologies used to produce 
the same product can be viewed as attributes of the product that are of different value to 
consumers. It can be argued that consumers value organic food more than conventional 
food and conventional food more than GM food. Since every consumer agrees on the 
relative quality of each variety (although they may differ in the intensity of their tastes), 
preferences would best be captured by a vertical differentiation model. We choose to 
specify preferences using a Mussa-Rosen (1978) model. Consumers’ utilities depend on 
an individual parameter θ ( 0<θ<1) and on both the quality (s) and price (p) of the 
consumption unit purchased, in the following fashion: 
( ) p s p s U − =θ θ ,.  
The parameter θ is distributed uniformly on the segment [ ] 1 , 0  and can be interpreted as 
the relative taste for quality. The above formulation for  ( ) p s U , θ   implies that the 
reservation utility of consumers (i.e., the utility level reached if they consume no units) is 
zero. We will interpret quality as the level of “purity” regarding GM material. 
At the production level, we assume fixed production (Q<1) with constant 
marginal cost c. However, we allow for differences in marginal costs depending on the 
technology used. The agricultural sector will be viewed as comprising a high number of 
farmers facing the same marginal costs. We will assume that farmers are profit 
maximizers and that they do not care about the type of technology they are using. In 
practice, farmers may tend to stick to a technology (an organic farmer would not shift to 
GM technology very easily), but from a long-run perspective our assumption is 
reasonable. We could imagine that farmers who do not want to shift technologies go   8
bankrupt and are replaced by newcomers who choose the most profitable technology. Our 
analysis also relies on the fact that proper labeling regulations exist and are enforced, so 
that consumers are perfectly informed of the technology used to produce a given 
agricultural good.  
TWO-TECHNOLOGY MODEL 
To derive our first set of results, we start with a simple two-technology model that 
describes the effects of the availability of a new cost-saving technology, namely genetic 
engineering, on the production pattern of an economy with only one preexisting 
technology. We can think of the preexisting technology as being an average between 
conventional and organic production technologies. In this section, we will refer to the 
GM technology as technology 1 and to the conventional/organic technology as 
technology 2.  
Starting with only technology 2 available (characterized by quality  2 s  and unit 
cost 2 c ), the competitive equilibrium price is determined by the market clearing condition. 
Q units must be sold, Q<1, and the aggregate demand for the good is  02 1 θ − , where  02 θ  
denotes the parameter of the consumer who is indifferent between consuming and not 







Q − = − = θ , which implies 
() Q s p − = 1 2
0
2 , where 
0
2 p denotes the price of the conventional good in the initial stage, 
before technology 1 becomes available. The profits made by the agricultural sector are 




2 1 − − = − = Π , and we will assume that these profits are positive. 
This means that  () Q s c − < 1 2 2 .   9
Let us now introduce the GM technology, characterized by a unit cost of 
production  1 c , with  2 1 c c < , and a quality level  1 s , with 2 1 s s < . We will assume that 
() Q s c − < 1 1 1  to ensure that the adoption of GM technology leads to positive profits. 
These assumptions can be justified by the fact that GM technology is cost-saving, but at 
the same time has lower value to consumers. 
Note that since production is fixed, the choice variable for farmers is the type of 
technology used. Moreover, in the case where technologies do coexist, we observe two 
markets, one for each production technology, whereas if only one variety is produced we 
do not observe the price of the other variety. Let us now define precisely what we mean 
by a competitive equilibrium.  
DEFINITION. We say that the equilibrium is competitive if one of the following 
conditions is satisfied. 
1.  Coexistence occurs and farmers maximize profits taking both prices as given. 
2.  Only one technology is present and the adoption of the alternative technology for 
an infinitesimal share of the production would not be profitable for farmers, 
taking the price of the existing variety as given.  
This definition accounts for the fact that an increase in the share of one 
technology has different market implications depending on whether or not this 
technology is already used. If the technology is already used, an infinitesimal increase in 
its share of adoption will not influence the market price, whereas if it is not present a new 
market will appear. This difference is outlined by Hollander, Monier-Dilhan and Ossard 
(1999) in their study of product grading. By adopting the above definition, we implicitly   10
assume that farmers, without having market power, can accurately foresee the price they 
will obtain when introducing a new variety (i.e., they form rational expectations). 
 
FIGURE 1. Equilibrium with coexistence of technologies 1 and 2. 
Let us now consider the case where two technologies coexist under perfect 
competition, as illustrated in FIGURE 1. In FIGURE 1, the horizontal axis represents the 
taste parameter θ.  01 θ  denotes the taste parameter of the consumer who is indifferent 
between consuming one unit of the good obtained through technology 1 and not 
consuming at all, and  12 θ  denotes the taste parameter of the consumer who is indifferent 
between consuming one unit of the good obtained through technology 1 and one unit of 
the good obtained through technology 2. The vertical axis represents the utility each type 
of consumer obtains from each consumption option.  
Since farmers take prices as given, in equilibrium the price-cost margin must be 
equalized between technologies. If this was not the case, farmers using the technology 








s1-p1   11
which would reduce further the difference in price-cost margins. As for the one-
technology case, the price of the low-quality good (here the GM good) is determined by 







Q − = − = θ . We obtain  ( ) Q s p − = 1 1
1
1 , which does 
not depend on unit costs. Equalization of price-cost margins across technologies yields 








2 p p > , i.e., the price of 
the conventional good is higher than that of the GM good in equilibrium.  
Let us now compute the respective market shares of conventional and GM food in 
this competitive equilibrium. Denoting by  12 θ   the parameter of the consumer who is 
indifferent between the two varieties, the market shares of GM and conventional goods 












































































σ σ . 
Coexistence requires that  1 0 1 < <σ . This condition can be expressed in terms of 















= λ , as  1 1 12 < < − λ Q . It 
turns out that this condition is also sufficient for coexistence to occur.  
PROPOSITION 1. A necessary and sufficient condition for both technologies to be used in 
the competitive equilibrium is that  1 1 12 < < − λ Q . 
A formal proof of PROPOSITION 1 is given in the Appendix. We also show that if 
Q − ≤1 12 λ , then  0 1 = σ , i.e., no farmer adopts the new technology. This could happen if   12
1 c  is too high or  1 s  is too low, i.e., if either the new technology is not sufficiently cost-
saving or it results in a very inferior quality, or both. Similarly, if  1 12 ≥ λ  then  0 2 = σ , 
i.e., all farmers adopt the new technology. This could be the case if biotechnology is very 
cost-saving or if consumers are almost indifferent about GM and conventional products. 
These two properties are summarized in the following propositions. 
PROPOSITION 2.  If  Q − ≤1 12 λ , then all farmers use technology 2 in the competitive 
equilibrium. 
PROPOSITION 3.  If  1 12 ≥ λ , then all farmers adopt technology 1 in the competitive 
equilibrium. 
The above results show that coexistence of both technologies is not ensured. In 
particular, a high discrepancy in costs between the two technologies or the indifference of 
consumers to the method of production could result in the disappearance of the 







= λ  describes the relative performance 
of technology 1 over technology 2. It is large when the cost of technology 1 is small 
relative to the cost of technology 2, and when the quality difference between technologies 
is not too high. 
Welfare analysis 
We now turn to the question of the efficiency of the competitive equilibria 
described above. With the specified consumer preferences, we can define consumer 
surplus for each consumer and add up this surplus across consumers to get total 
consumers’ surplus. We can also add up individual farmers’ profits to get the total profits 
of the industry. This enables us to define the total surplus of the economy as:   13










− − − − + = ∫ ∫ . 
We can rewrite this as: 











S θ θ θ θ θ θ − − − − − + − = . 
To find the socially efficient share for GM technology, we solve the following 
program: 




to s S , 















This leads to the following proposition: 
PROPOSITION 4. If  1 1 12 < < − λ Q , then coexistence is socially efficient and the efficient 
share of technology 1 is  () 12 1 1
1
1 λ σ − − =
Q
. If  Q − ≤1 12 λ , then coexistence is not 
socially efficient and efficiency requires that only technology 2 be used. If  1 12 ≥ λ , then 
coexistence is not socially efficient and efficiency requires that only technology 1 be used. 
Therefore, the perfectly competitive outcome is socially efficient, even when only 
one technology is present. 
PROPOSITION 5. Perfect competition in the production sector leads to a socially efficient 
level of adoption of the new technology. 
PROPOSITION 5 does not imply, however, that all agents are better off under an 
equilibrium with coexistence than in the initial situation. Typically, when there is 
coexistence, producers are better off since the price-cost margin has increased, but all 
consumers weakly prefer the initial situation. Consumers with  Q − = < 1 01 θ θ  are   14
indifferent between the two states since their utility is zero. Consumers with  12 01 θ θ θ < <  
reach the utility level  ( ) Q s s p s U − − = − = 1 1 1
1
1 1
1 θ θ θ  in the second state while they were 
enjoying  ( ) Q s s p s U − − = − = 1 2 2
0
2 2
0 θ θ θ   in the first state. Since 
() ( ) θ θ θ − − − = − Q s s U U 1 1 2
0 1  and  Q − = > 1 01 θ θ , those consumers are unambiguously 
worse off. Finally, consumers with  12 θ θ >   reached the utility level 
() Q s s p s U − − = − = 1 2 2
0
2 2
0 θ θ θ   in the first state, and now reach 
() 1 2 1 2
1
2 2
1 1 c c Q s s p s U + − − − = − = θ θ θ . The change in their utility level is then 
() ( )( ) 1 2 1 2
0 1 1 c c Q s s U U − − − − = − θ θ . Since coexistence requires that  1 1 12 < < − λ Q , 
those consumers are also worse off. It could be shown, similarly, that when GM 
technology is the only technology used, producers are better off but consumers are worse 
off. 
THREE-TECHNOLOGY MODEL 
In this section, we explore the specific consequences of the availability of 
biotechnology on the organic sector. We will assume perfect competition among farmers, 
and continue to assume that farmers can switch technologies. Parameters () 2 2,c s now 
refer specifically to the conventional technology (excluding the organic technology), and 
we introduce parameters () 3 3,c s  to characterize the organic technology, with  3 2 1 s s s < <  
and  3 2 1 c c c < < . We will start from an initial state where conventional and organic 
farming are present and study the effects of the introduction of biotechnology. From the 
two-technology analysis, we know that a necessary (and sufficient) condition for 










Q λ , and we will assume that this condition is satisfied. The 
equilibrium prices in the initial state are  () Q s p − = 1 2
0
2  and 




3 1 c c Q s c c p p − + − = − + = . The total industry profits are then 
() () Q c Q s 2 2
0 1 − − = Π . We will assume that  ( ) Q s c − < 1 2 2  so that farmers earn positive 
profits in the initial state. The shares of technology 2 and 3 in the initial state can be 
readily derived from the results of our two-technology model: 
() 23 2 1
1
1 λ σ − − =
Q
,  () 23 3 1
1
λ σ − =
Q
. 
We further assume that  ( ) Q s c − < 1 1 1   to ensure that the adoption of GM 
technology leads to positive profits.  
 
FIGURE 2. Equilibrium with coexistence of technologies 1, 2, and 3. 
Under perfect competition, if the three technologies are used in equilibrium then 








θ12  θ23  θ01   16







Q − = − = θ . Hence, we 
must have  () Q s p − = 1 1
1
1 . We then obtain  ( ) 1 2 1
1
2 1 c c Q s p − + − =  and 
() 1 3 1
1
3 1 c c Q s p − + − = . The market shares  1 σ ,  2 σ and  3 σ   are determined by the 
relationships  01 12 1 θ θ σ − = Q , 12 23 2 θ θ σ − = Q  and  23 3 1 θ σ − = Q , as illustrated in FIGURE 



























































































































The second condition ensures that the share of organic products is strictly between 
zero and one and this condition is satisfied since in the initial state organic farming is 
assumed to coexist with conventional farming. Besides, the condition  Q < − 12 23 λ λ  will 
automatically be satisfied as long as  12 1 λ < −Q  and  1 23 < λ . The above set of necessary 
conditions can thus be reduced to the sole condition  23 12 1 λ λ < < −Q . It is shown in the 
Appendix that these conditions are also sufficient for a competitive equilibrium with 
coexistence of the three technologies. 
PROPOSITION 6. In the three-technology model, a necessary and sufficient condition for 
a competitive equilibrium with coexistence of technologies 1, 2, and 3 is that   17
23 12 1 λ λ < < −Q . If such an equilibrium occurs, the shares of technology 1, 2, and 3 are 
given by  () 12 1 1
1
1 λ σ − − =
Q
,  () 12 23 2
1
λ λ σ − =
Q
 and  () 23 3 1
1
λ σ − =
Q
. 
As a matter of fact, the entire set of market outcomes under perfect competition 
can be characterized in terms of the values taken by the parameters  12 λ  and  13 λ . Those 
parameters reflect the performance of technology 1 relative to technologies 2 and 3, 
respectively. The following results are proved formally in the Appendix. 
PROPOSITION 7. If  Q − ≤1 12 λ , then technologies 2 and 3 are used in the competitive 
equilibrium and the shares of technology 2 and 3 are the same as in the initial state. 
PROPOSITION 8. If  1 12 23 < ≤ λ λ  or  1 12 ≥ λ  and  1 13 < λ , then under perfect competition 
technologies 1 and 3 are used in equilibrium and the respective shares of technology 1 
and 3 are  () 13 1 1
1
1 λ σ − − =
Q
c  and  () 13 3 1
1
λ σ − =
Q
c . 
PROPOSITION 9. If  1 12 ≥ λ  and  1 13 ≥ λ , then under perfect competition technology 1 is 
the only technology used. 
DISCUSSION 
Let us summarize briefly the above findings. If the performance of technology 1 
relative to technology 2 (as defined by the parameter  12 λ ) is too low, then technology 1 
will not be used under perfect competition. Note that we do not need to make any 
assumptions regarding the performance of technology 1 relative to technology 3 in this 
case, i.e., the fact that  Q − ≤1 12 λ  suffices to infer that technology 1 will not be used.  
If the performance of technology 1 relative to technology 2 and to technology 3 is high, 
i.e.,  1 12 ≥ λ  and  1 13 ≥ λ , then technology 1 will drive out technologies 2 and 3.   18
Coexistence between technologies 1 and 3 will be observed in two instances: if 
the performance of technology 1 is high relative to technology 2 but not too high relative 
to technology 3, or if the performance of technology 1 relative to technology 2 is higher 
than the performance of technology 2 relative to technology 3. 
Coexistence between the three technologies will occur when  23 12 1 λ λ < < −Q , i.e., 
when technology 1 performs well enough relative to technology 2, but not better than 
how technology 2 performs relative to technology 3. In this case, the share of organic 
production is the same as in the initial state. This means that the introduction of GM 
products will only decrease the share of conventional products. 
As in the two-technology model, coexistence between technologies is not ensured. 
It could well be that GM technology is not adopted, either because it not sufficiently cost-
saving or because consumers perceive the resulting product to be of very poor quality. On 
the contrary, if GM technology performs well relative to the existing technologies, it 
could drive out the conventional technology or even the organic technology. However, 
our model predicts that if the conventional variety continues to be offered in equilibrium, 
so does the organic variety.  
Production externalities 
In the above analysis, production externalities were disregarded. However, one of 
the main concerns about GM crops is the negative externality that they can create on 
conventional or organic farming. More precisely, it is argued that if GM technology is 
adopted, the cost of production for conventional and organic technologies could increase 
due additional measures taken to prevent crop contamination, and that the value of 
conventional and organic production could be reduced due to the adoption of tolerance   19
levels for the adventitious presence of GM material. Both effects are likely to increase 
with the share of GM technology used in the agricultural sector.  
In terms of our three-technology model, we can think of these production 
externalities as an increase in  2 c  and  3 c  and a decrease in  2 s  and  3 s . This implies an 
increase in both  12 λ  and  13 λ , while the effect on  23 λ   is ambiguous. For the sake of 
simplicity, we will assume that the production externalities only affect the organic sector. 
This could be the case if the tolerance level for conventional products has been set high 
enough so that no costly measure is necessary to prevent contamination, and if consumers 
do not discount the quality of conventional products when they satisfy the regulatory 
threshold. As a result, we will observe an increase in  13 λ  and  23 λ , while  12 λ  will remain 
unchanged.  
If the three technologies coexist in equilibrium, the effect of the production 
externality will be to reduce the share of organic production to the benefit of the 
conventional sector. Similarly, if GM technology coexists with organic technology, the 
effect of the externality will be to reduce the share of organic production. Finally, since 
13 λ   increases, the outcome where GM technology is the only technology used in 
equilibrium will be more likely to occur. 
The evolution of consumers’ perceptions 
Our three-technology model can also be used to study the evolution of the three 
markets as consumers become indifferent to GM, starting from an initial situation where 
Q − ≤1 12 λ . We believe that this assumption is plausible for Europe even if consumers 
are currently opposed to GM technology. As suggested in a recent study by Noussair, 
Robin, and Ruffieux (2004) based on experimental economics techniques, European   20
consumers might not be as reluctant to consume GM products as outlined in the previous 
literature. Besides, as stated in the introduction, one of the main justifications the 
European Commission gave for the new GM legislation is that stringent rules would 
restore consumer confidence in GM products, thus allowing a market for GM foods to 
emerge.  
For the purpose of this analysis, we neglect any production externality. Let us 
assume that the parameter  1 s  increases,  starting  from  a value small enough for the 
condition  Q − ≤1 12 λ  to hold. An increase in  1 s  will increase  12 λ  and  13 λ  but will not 
affect  23 λ . As  1 s  increases, we will have  23 12 1 λ λ < < −Q , i.e., GM technology will be 
adopted. As  1 s  continues to increase, the share of GM technology will increase at the 
expense of conventional technology, but the share of organic technology will remain 
unaffected as long as conventional technology is used. When  1 12 23 < ≤ λ λ , conventional 
technology is no longer used and as  1 s increases, the share of GM technology continues to 
grow at the expense of organic technology. When  1 12 ≥ λ , the outcome will depend on 
the value of  13 λ . If  1 13 < λ , then organic and GM technologies will continue to coexist. 








. Otherwise, organic technology will disappear if  1 s  gets close enough to  2 s . 
CONCLUSION 
The adoption of GM crop technology remains a controversial issue in Europe. 
The new regulatory framework for the commercialization of GM food and feed in the 
E.U. has brought many issues to the forefront, including questions related to the   21
coexistence of GM and other crops. Concerns have been expressed that costs would rise 
for conventional and organic farmers due to required segregation. Current regulatory 
proposals in several E.U. member states are designed to try and ensure coexistence 
among GM, conventional and organic production. 
In this paper, we have used a simple Mussa-Rosen type model of preferences to 
capture the effects of introducing a cost-saving GM crop on incumbent crops, taking 
explicitly into account consumers’ distaste for GM food products. Using a two-
technology model, we derived necessary and sufficient conditions for coexistence and 
showed that perfectly competitive farmers with rational expectations would adopt the 
socially efficient level of GM technology. We then solved a three-technology model to 
study the impacts of the availability of GM technology on conventional and organic 
production. We formally characterized the entire set of possible outcomes using only 
three parameters that reflect technologies’ relative performance. In the absence of any 
production externality, we showed that if conventional and organic production 
technologies coexist in the initial state, then the introduction of GM technology could 
result in coexistence of the three technologies, disappearance of the conventional sector, 
or disappearance of both the conventional and organic sectors. 
We used our model to explore the effects of negative production externalities 
created by GM technology on the organic sector, and found evidence that such 
production externalities would reduce the share of organic in the crop mix compared to 
the case where no production externality exists. We also found that externalities could 
precipitate the disappearance of the organic sector in cases where the conventional sector 
has already disappeared.   22
Finally, we studied the effect of a change in consumers’ perception of GM 
products, and showed that as consumers become indifferent between GM and 
conventional products, conventional technology is abandoned. In some cases, organic 
production could disappear as well. 
REFERENCES 
Bock, A.-K. et al., 2002. “Scenarios for co-existence of genetically modified, 
conventional and organic crops in European agriculture.” Institute for Prospective 
Technological Studies, European Commission, Brussels. 
Brookes, G., 2004. “Co-existence of GM and non GM crops: current experience and key 
principles.” PG Economics Ltd. 
Bullock, D. S. and M. Desquilbet, 2002. “The Economics of non-GMO Segregation and 
Identity Preservation.” Food Policy, Vol. 27(1), pp. 81-99. 
Byrne, D., 2001. “A European Approach to Food Safety and GMOs.” National Press 
Club, Washington D.C., Washington. 
Crespi, J. M. and S. Marette, 2003. “‘Does Contain’ vs. ‘Does Not Contain’: Does it 
Matter which GMO Label is Used?” European Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 16, 
pp. 327-344. 
European Commission, 2003. “Commission recommendation of 23 July 2003 on 
guidelines for the development of national strategies and best practices to ensure the co-
existence of genetically modified crops with conventional and organic farming.” Official 
Journal of the European Union, Vol. L 189: 36-47. 
European Parliament and Council, 2003.  Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 2003 on genetically modified 
food and feed. Official Journal of the European Union, Vol. L268, pp. 1-23. 
European Parliament and Council, 2003.  Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 2003 on genetically modified 
food and feed. Official Journal of the European Union, Vol. L268, pp. 24-28. 
Fulton, M. and K. Giannakas, 2004. “Inserting GM Products into the Food Chain: The 
Market and Welfare Effects of Different Labeling and Regulatory Regimes.” American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 86(1), pp. 42-60. 
Giannakas, K. and M. Fulton, 2002. “Consumption Effects of Genetic Modification: 
What if Consumers Are Right?” Agricultural Economics, Vol. 27, pp. 97-109. 
Hollander, A., S. Monier-Dilhan and H. Ossard, 1999. “Pleasures of Cockaigne: 
Quality Gaps, Market Structure, and the Amount of Grading.” American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics, Vol. 81, pp. 501-511.   23
Lapan, H. and G. Moschini, 2000. “Incomplete Adoption of a Superior Innovation.” 
Economica, Vol. 67, pp. 525-542. 
Lapan, H. and G. Moschini, 2004. “Innovation and Trade with Endogenous Market 
Failure: The Case of Genetically Modified Products.” American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics, Vol. 86(3), pp. 634-648. 
Moschini, G. and H. Lapan, 1997. “Intellectual Property Rights and the Welfare Effects 
of Agricultural R&D.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 79, pp. 1229-
1242. 
Mussa, M., and S. Rosen, 1978. “Monopoly and Product Quality.” Journal of Economic 
Theory, Vol. 18, pp. 301-317. 
Noussair, C., S. N. Robin and B. Ruffieux, 2004. “Do Consumers Really Refuse to Buy 
Genetically Modified Food?” Economic Journal, Vol. 114, pp. 102-120. 
APPENDIX 
Proof of PROPOSITION 1 
Suppose that  1 1 12 < < − λ Q . Firstly, suppose that in equilibrium only technology 2 is 
used. If technology 1 was used for an infinitesimal share of total production, the resulting 
price-cost margin would be  () 1 1 1 c Q s − −  instead of  ( ) 2 2 1 c Q s − − . Since by assumption 
12 1 λ < −Q , it would be profitable. Hence we cannot have a competitive equilibrium with 
only technology 2. Secondly, suppose that in equilibrium only technology 1 is used. If 
technology 2 was used for an infinitesimal share of total production, the resulting price 









θ , i.e., we would have  ( ) 1 2 1 2 1 s s Q s p − + − = . The resulting 
price-cost margin would be  () 2 1 2 1 1 c s s Q s − − + −  instead of  ( ) 1 1 1 c Q s − − . Since  1 12 < λ , 
this would be profitable. Hence we cannot have a competitive equilibrium with only 
technology 1. Therefore the only possible market outcome involves coexistence of 
technologies 1 and 2.   24
Proof of PROPOSITION 2 
Suppose that  Q − ≤1 12 λ . Firstly, note that from PROPOSITION 1, an equilibrium with 
coexistence cannot occur, since a necessary condition for this would be that 
1 1 12 < < − λ Q . Hence, suppose that in equilibrium only technology 1 is used. If 
technology 2 was used for an infinitesimal share of total production, the resulting price 









θ , i.e., we would have  ( ) 1 2 1 2 1 s s Q s p − + − = . The resulting 
price-cost margin would be  ( ) 2 1 2 1 1 c s s Q s − − + −  instead  of  ( ) 1 1 1 c Q s − − . Since 
1 1 12 < − ≤ Q λ ,  this would be profitable. Hence we cannot have a competitive 
equilibrium with only technology 1. Therefore the competitive equilibrium involves only 
technology 2. 
Proof of PROPOSITION 3 
Suppose  1 12 ≥ λ . Firstly, note that from PROPOSITION 1, an equilibrium with coexistence 
cannot occur. Hence, suppose that in equilibrium only technology 2 is used. If technology 
1 was used for an infinitesimal share of total production, the resulting price-cost margin 
would be  () 1 1 1 c Q s − −  instead  of  ( ) 2 2 1 c Q s − − . Since  Q − > ≥ 1 1 12 λ , this would be 
profitable. Hence we cannot have a competitive equilibrium with only technology 2. 
Therefore the competitive equilibrium involves only technology 1. 
LEMMA. In the three-technology model, if technologies 2 and 3 coexist in the initial state, 
then an equilibrium with coexistence of technologies 1 and 2 cannot occur. 
Proof of LEMMA 
Suppose that we have an equilibrium with only technologies 1 and 2. If technology 3 was 










θ , i.e., we would have  ( ) 2 3 1 2 1 2 3 2 3 1 s s c c Q s s s p p − + − + − = − + = . 
The resulting price-cost margin would be  ( ) 3 2 3 1 2 1 3 3 1 c s s c c Q s c p − − + − + − = −  
instead of  () 1 1 1 c Q s − − . Since coexistence of technologies 2 and 3 in the initial state 
requires in particular that  1 23 < λ , this move would be profitable. Hence an equilibrium 
with coexistence of technologies 1 and 2 cannot occur. 
Proof of PROPOSITION 6 
Suppose that  23 12 1 λ λ < < −Q . Firstly, note that market outcomes involving only 
technology 2 or only technology 3 cannot occur, since in the initial situation technology 2 
and 3 coexist. Besides, the above LEMMA rules out coexistence of technologies 1 and 2. 
So the possible market outcomes are: coexistence of technologies 1, 2, and 3; coexistence 
of technologies 2 and 3; coexistence of technologies 1 and 3; only technology 1. 
Suppose that in equilibrium only technologies 2 and 3 are used. If technology 1 was used 
for an infinitesimal share of total production, the resulting price-cost margin would be 
() 1 1 1 c Q s − −  instead of  () 2 2 1 c Q s − − . Since by assumption  Q − >1 12 λ , this would be 
profitable. Hence we cannot have a competitive equilibrium with only technology 2. 
Suppose that in equilibrium only technologies 1 and 3 are used. If technology 2 was used 

















θ θ . Using the fact that  () Q s p − = 1 1 1  and 
() 1 3 1 3 1 c c Q s p − + − = , this gives  ( ) ( ) 1 2 13 1 2 1 s s Q s p − + − = λ . The resulting price-cost 
margin would then be  ()( ) 2 1 2 13 1 1 c s s Q s − − + − λ  instead  of  ( ) 1 1 1 c Q s − − . Hence, this 
move would be profitable if and only if  12 13 λ λ > , which can be shown to be equivalent to   26
12 23 λ λ > . Since by assumption  23 12 λ λ < , we can conclude that the introduction of 
technology 2 would be profitable, and thus that there cannot be an equilibrium with 
technologies 1 and 3. 
Suppose that only technology 1 is used in equilibrium. If technology 2 was used for an 










i.e., we would have  () 1 2 1 2 1 s s Q s p − + − = . The resulting price-cost margin would be 
() 2 1 2 1 1 c s s Q s − − + −  instead of  ( ) 1 1 1 c Q s − − . Since by assumption  1 23 12 < < λ λ , this 
would be profitable. Hence we cannot have a competitive equilibrium with only 
technology 1.  
We have proved that the only possible outcome is an equilibrium with coexistence of the 
three technologies.  
Proof of PROPOSITION 7 
Suppose  Q − ≤1 12 λ . Firstly, note that the following cases cannot occur: coexistence of 
the three technologies (from PROPOSITION 6), coexistence of technologies 1 and 2 (from 
LEMMA), only technology 2 or only technology 3 (from the initial state). The equilibrium 
can either involve technologies 2 and 3, technologies 1 and 3, or only technology 1. 
Suppose that in equilibrium only technology 1 is used. If technology 2 was used for an 










i.e., we would have  () 1 2 1 2 1 s s Q s p − + − = . The resulting price-cost margin would be 
() 2 1 2 1 1 c s s Q s − − + −  instead  of  ( ) 1 1 1 c Q s − − . Since  1 1 12 < − ≤ Q λ ,  this would be 
profitable. Hence we cannot have a competitive equilibrium with only technology 1.   27
Suppose that in equilibrium technologies 1 and 3 coexist, and suppose that technology 2 
is used for an infinitesimal share of the production. By the same reasoning, we can 
conclude that this move would be profitable. 
Therefore, the only possible equilibrium is to have coexistence between technologies 2 
and 3. 
Proof of PROPOSITION 8 
Suppose first that  1 12 23 < ≤ λ λ . Given PROPOSITION 6, the LEMMA and the initial state, 
the equilibrium can either involve technologies 2 and 3, technologies 1 and 3, or only 
technology 1.  
Suppose that the equilibrium involves technologies 2 and 3. If technology 1 was used for 
an infinitesimal share of total production, the resulting price-cost margin would be 
() 1 1 1 c Q s − −  instead of  () 2 2 1 c Q s − − . Since by assumption  12 23 1 λ λ ≤ < −Q  , this would 
be profitable. Hence we cannot have a competitive equilibrium with technologies 2 and 3. 
Suppose that the equilibrium involves only technology 1, and let us introduce technology 










θ , i.e., we would have  ( ) 1 2 1 2 1 s s Q s p − + − = . The resulting price-cost 
margin would be  () 2 1 2 1 1 c s s Q s − − + −  instead  of  ( ) 1 1 1 c Q s − − . Since by assumption 
1 12 < λ , this move would be profitable. 
Hence the only possible equilibrium is coexistence between technologies 1 and 3. 
Suppose now that  1 12 ≥ λ  and  1 13 < λ . As before, the equilibrium can either involve 
technologies 2 and 3, technologies 1 and 3, or only technology 1.    28
Suppose that the equilibrium involves technologies 2 and 3. If technology 1 was used for 
an infinitesimal share of total production, the resulting price-cost margin would be 
() 1 1 1 c Q s − −  instead of  () 2 2 1 c Q s − − . Since by assumption  Q − > ≥ 1 1 12 λ , this would be 
profitable. Hence we cannot have a competitive equilibrium with technologies 2 and 3. 
Suppose that the equilibrium involves only technology 1, and let us introduce technology 










θ , i.e., we would have  ( ) 1 3 1 3 1 s s Q s p − + − = . The resulting price-cost 
margin would be  () 3 1 3 1 1 c s s Q s − − + −  instead  of  ( ) 1 1 1 c Q s − − . Since by assumption 
1 13 < λ , this move would be profitable. 
Hence the only possible equilibrium is coexistence between technologies 1 and 3. 
Proof of PROPOSITION 9 
Suppose  1 12 ≥ λ  and  1 13 ≥ λ . Given PROPOSITION 6, the LEMMA and the initial state, the 
equilibrium can either involve technologies 2 and 3, technologies 1 and 3, or only 
technology 1.  
Suppose that in equilibrium technologies 2 and 3 coexist, and let us introduce technology 
1 for an infinitesimal share of the production. The resulting price-cost margin would be 
() 1 1 1 c Q s − −  instead of  () 2 2 1 c Q s − − . Since by assumption  Q − > ≥ 1 1 12 λ  , this would 
be profitable. Hence we cannot have a competitive equilibrium with technologies 2 and 3. 
Suppose that in equilibrium technologies 1 and 3 coexist. From PROPOSITION 1, we must 
have 1 1 13 < < − λ Q , which contradicts our assumption that  1 13 ≥ λ . 
So the only possible equilibrium involves only technology 1.  